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Russia’s common market takes shape: Price convergence 




This paper analyzes the spatial structure of goods market integration in Russia, characteriz-
ing regions into three states: (a) integrated, (b) not integrated but trending toward integra-
tion, and (c) not integrated and not trending toward integration. Using time series of the 
cost of a staples basket across 75 regions of Russia for 1994-2000, I exploit a nonlinear 
cointegration relationship with an asymptotically subsiding trend to capture movement to-
ward integration. The analysis suggests that 36% of Russian regions were integrated with 
the national market over 1994-2000, 44% were in the process of integrating with the na-
tional market, and 20% of regions were not integrated and not trending toward integration. 
 
JEL classification: C32, P22, R10, R15 
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Russia’s common market takes shape: Price convergence 




Tässä työssä analysoidaan Venäjän hyödykemarkkinoiden maantieteellistä integraatiota. 
Alueet jaotellaan kolmeen: a) integroituneet, b) alueet, jotka eivät vielä integroituneet, 
mutta joiden integraation aste kasvaa, ja c) alueet, jotka eivät ole integroituneita ja joiden 
integraation aste ei kasva. Markkinoiden integraation astetta tutkitaan peruselintarvikkeista 
koostuvan hyödykekorin avulla 75:llä eri alueella. Empiirisessä analyysissä käytetään 
epälineaarista yhteisintegroituvuusmenetelmää, jossa trendimuuttuja on asymptoottisesti 
pienenevä, minkä tulkitaan merkitsevän integraation lisääntymistä. Analyysin mukaan 36 
% Venäjän alueista oli integroitunut kansallisten markkinoiden kanssa, 44 % alueista ei 
ollut integroitunut, mutta integraation aste oli kasvussa, ja 20 % kuului ryhmään, joka ei 
ollut integroitunut ja integraatio ei lisääntynyt vuosina 1994–2000. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Political changes and Russia’s rapid shift in the early 1990s from the centrally planned 
economy to one governed by market principles gave rise to a dramatic regional fragmenta-
tion of its economic space (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2003; Gluschenko, 2003). As a result, 
reunification of economic space has become major political talking point in Russia today. 
Some commentators even suggest that politicians’ ability to deal with the problem has be-
come a litmus test for judging the country’s overall success at market reform. 
A single economic space is manifested chiefly as integration of the goods market. 
Gluschenko (2003, 2004a) proposes that after a period of increased disconnectedness of 
the Russian market, a trend toward market integration emerged in 1994. Berkowitz and 
DeJong (2001, 2003) obtain similar results. These papers all consider, however, the tempo-
ral pattern of market integration in Russia rather than the spatial pattern. Their results are 
obtained through cross-sectional analysis and averaged across country’s regions.  
This paper deals with the spatial structure of goods market integration in Russia 
through time series analysis. Spatial structure is examined by considering three possible 
states for each region: integrated, not integrated but trending toward integration, or not in-
tegrated and not trending toward integration. 
To model movement toward integration (long-run inter-market price convergence), 
I introduce a class of intermediate processes between non-stationary and stationary proc-
esses, specifically non-stationary processes that become stationary over time. This is mod-
eled by an autoregression with a nonlinear, asymptotically subsiding trend. Two markets 
are deemed to be trending toward mutual integration when their price differential satisfies 
this model. Otherwise, I test to see whether the markets are integrated, using a conven-
tional AR(1) model. In both cases, a structural break characterizing the 1998 financial cri-
sis in Russia is taken into account. The source data for the empirical analysis are time se-
ries of the cost of a staples basket across 75 regions of Russia for 1994-2000 with a 
monthly frequency, the average Russian cost used as a representative of the national mar-
ket. 
Using this methodology, I find 36% of Russian regions to be integrated with the na-
tional market, 44% of regions trending toward integration with the national market, and 
20% non-integrated with no trend toward integration. Since regions both trending and not 
trending toward integration are found, the overall market direction is initially unclear. Ex-Konstantin Gluschenko 
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amining the behavior of price dispersion, however, reveals convergence of standard devia-
tions of regional prices (σ-convergence). Thus, despite the presence of regions not tending 
to integration, the predominant trend is toward increased market integration. Non-integrated 
regions exhibit no σ-divergence. 
The issue of market integration in transition economies has been the subject of a 
number of studies. Using cointegration analysis, Gardner and Brooks (1994), Goodwin et 
al. (1999), and Berkowitz et al. (1998) examine price dispersion among Russian cities dur-
ing the early transition years (through 1995). They find the Russian market weakly inte-
grated with signs of potential improvement. Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) subsequently 
identify a “Red Belt” group of pro-Communist and anti-market-reform regions as a culprit 
behind segmentation of the Russian market. Berkowitz and DeJong (2001, 2003) estimate 
a segment of the integration trajectory for Russia (corroborated by Gluschenko, 2003, with 
an alternative methodology). Analyzing cointegration and threshold relationships for pairs 
of aggregated Russian regions, Gluschenko (2002) and Gluschenko and Koneva (2004) 
find integrated and non-integrated pairs. 
Conway (1999), using 1993-1996 data, examines price convergence among market 
locations within Kiev, Ukraine. He finds significant evidence of price convergence due to 
arbitrage by buyers and sellers at the various local markets, but also sizeable and persistent 
divergences from the law of one price. Cushman et al. (2001) compare prices for foods in 
Kiev during 1991-1992 with the prices of similar goods in the US. Commodity real ex-
change rates are found to possess deterministic trends that should close the yawning initial 
price gap.  
This paper contributes to the above literature in two aspects. From the methodo-
logical standpoint, it proposes a time series method of analyzing for trends toward integra-
tion, as failure to consider such trends may result in overstatement of the problems of mar-
kets in transition and fail to capture the essence of the transition process itself. From the 
empirical standpoint, the paper obtains a geographical pattern of market integration that 
covers nearly the entire territory of Russia. Taken jointly, the results of Gluschenko (2003) 
and this paper provide a two-dimensional, time-space pattern of Russia’s market integra-
tion. The paper also ties in with the literature on empirics of economic growth.
1 For exam-
                                                 
1 Michael Beenstock has pointed out the resemblance of the convergence problem in economic growth and 
the problem of price dynamics. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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ple, the proposed method for analyzing price convergence also may have potential in 
analysis of income convergence. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, methodol-
ogy of the analysis and the data used are described. In section 3, empirical results are pre-
sented. Conclusions are offered in section 4. 
 
 
2  Methodology and data 
 
2.1  Strategy of the analysis 
 
Perfect integration of a spatially distributed goods market implies an absence of impedi-
ments to the movement of goods between all spatial segments (e.g., national regions). In 
other words, a perfectly integrated market would operate like a single market despite spa-
tial segmentation. The price of a (tradable) good across regions would be uniform so that 
the law of one price, maintained by inter-regional arbitrage, holds. Thus, the law of one 
price may be used as a theoretical benchmark for empirically analyzing goods market inte-
gration. 
Market integration in Russia can be seen as a two-stage process, involving an initial 
stage of progressive segmentation beginning in January 1992 and a second stage of in-
creased integration beginning around 1994. The second stage is the subject of this study. I 
hypothesize that the Russian goods market will eventually come to the final steady state of 
complete integration, i.e. a state of price equality across all regions. In this second stage of 
evolution, the market may be said to be in transition to this steady integration state. Hence, 
I suggest three types of regions can exist: (a) integrated regions, where price equality al-
ready prevails; (b) non-integrated regions trending toward integration, i.e. prices are con-
verging toward a common level; and (c) non-integrated regions that show no indication of 
an integrating trend. For brevity, hereafter regions from the second group are referred to as 
“regions trending toward integration”, and regions from the third group are referred to as 
simply “non-integrated regions.” 
In the above context, the term convergence of prices becomes ambiguous. Indeed, 
when considering types (a) and (b), two distinct concepts of convergence are possible. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the difference between the concepts: the thin lines depict actual dynamics 
of prices, while the thick lines represent their theoretical long-run trajectories. (Hereafter, Konstantin Gluschenko 
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prt and pst denote the price of a good in regions r and s, respectively, at time t ∈ [0, T], and 
prst = prt/pst. The logarithmic representation Prt = ln(prt), Pst = ln(pst), and Prst = ln(prt/pst) 
will also be used below.)  
 
Fig. 1. Two concepts of price convergence 
These two concepts can be described as follows:  
Figure 1(a) implies regions r and s are type (a). They are in spatial equilibrium, such that 
price disparities between regions are merely random shocks dying out over time. Prices 
fluctuate around parity and permanently tend to return to it. This is the case dealt with in 
the literature on the law of one price and purchasing power parity (convergence to the law 
of one price/PPP). The term “convergence” here relates to the shocks, implying their con-
vergence to zero. It characterizes the short-run behavior of prices. The long-run behavior 
of prices is described by the trajectory 
 
prt/pst = 1,  t = 0,…,T.                   (1) 
 
Thus, I designate this concept as “short-run convergence.” 
Figure 1(b) implies that regions r and s are type (b). The regions are trending toward spa-
tial equilibrium:  
p 
T  t  0 
p 





T  t  0 
p 




(a) Short-run convergence (ordinary cointegration) 
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p p .                   (2)  
 
We see prices in s catch up with prices in r in the figure. Indeed, price disparity perma-
nently diminishes over time and prices fluctuate around this general trend due to random 
shocks. This is the case the literature on economic growth (regarding incomes, outputs, 
etc.) refers to simply as “convergence.” Here, in the short run, the prices converge to the 
long-run trajectory (i.e. random deviations die out over time), and the trajectory itself con-
verges to the parity line prt/pst = 1 over the long run. Here, “convergence” relates to the 
prices themselves, implying long-run convergence of their differences to zero over time. 
Hence, I designate this concept “long-run convergence.” 
For both short-term and long-term convergence, absolute price parity is taken as the 
steady state. This implies perfect integration – a rare condition in the real world. We would 
reasonably expect persistent (equilibrium) difference in prices between r and s induced by 
natural market frictions such as physical distance and difficult access to a number of re-
gions. Thus, it may be more realistic to relax the criterion for market integration, allowing 
for such market frictions. In such case, relative price parity would have to be dealt with. 
Unity on the right side of (1) and (2) can be substituted for an arbitrary constant ratio of 
prices, αrs.
2 
The trouble here is that α reflects both the effect of natural, irremovable market 
frictions (which is compatible with the notion of integration) and the effect of artificial, 
transient ones that impede market integration. This can be formalized as α = αe(Lrs)⋅αf, 
where αe is the effect of transportation costs proxied by distance between r and s, Lrs, and 
αf is the effect of “anti-integration forces.” In the context of a pairwise time series analysis, 
however, there is no way to distinguish αe and αf. This is why the strict version of the law 
of one price is adopted in the paper as a benchmark for integration, any deterministic dif-
ference in prices being interpreted as an indication of non-integration. Certainly, this may 
result in understatement of the degree of market integration. Therefore, at the end of Sec-
tion 3 I check to see whether non-integration is predominantly due to persistent inter-
regional differences in prices or to stochastic or deterministic divergence of prices.  
Testing for the equality of prices or price levels, i.e. for relationship (1), is a con-
ventional exercise in papers on the law of one price and PPP. The test is whether (log) re-
                                                 
2 Exploiting cross-section analysis, Gluschenko (2003, 2004a) has implemented such a relaxation. Konstantin Gluschenko 
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gional prices Prt and Pst are cointegrated with the predetermined cointegrating vector (1, –
1), or, equivalently, whether price differential Prst is stationary. However, in providing an 
“all-or-nothing” answer, this traditional approach is impotent in revealing a transitional 
case described by (2), i.e. the case where a process {Prst}t=0,…,T is not stationary, but tends 
to stationarity over time. Using conventional cointegration analysis, such a process would 
be simply recognized as non-stationary, giving no way to separate region groups (b) and 
(c). 
There are several approaches to this problem. The issue of long-run convergence is 
extensively addressed in the economic growth literature (see e.g. the survey by Durlauf and 
Quah, 1999). 
The most widely used concepts of convergence in the economic growth context are 
σ-convergence and β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Reformulated in the 
terms of prices, σ-convergence occurs when the cross-sectional dispersion of prices, meas-
ured, e.g. by the standard deviation, σ(Pt), tends to decrease over time: σ(Pt)/σ(Pt–τ) < 1. In 
the same terms, if the regression of Prt on Pr,t–τ yields β < 1, where β is the coefficient on 
Pr,t–τ, then it is said that the data set exhibits β-convergence. Testing cross-sectionally, both 
approaches yield a spatially aggregated result, not a spatial pattern of convergence. They 
are thus unsuitable for solving our proposed problem.  
A few researchers exploit a time series concept referred to as “forecast conver-
gence” by Bernard and Durlauf (1995) and “stochastic convergence” by Carlino and Mills 
(1996). Bernard and Durlauf’s paper defines convergence essentially as in (2), but tests for 
convergence with (1), applying standard cointegration analysis. Which is to say the authors 
do not deal with long-run convergence as such, examining only whether convergence has 
been completed by the beginning of a given time period (i.e. short-run convergence). Car-
lino and Mills (1996) employ a cointegration relationship with a deterministic linear trend. 
Provided that the trend of an inter-location difference is directed towards zero, stationarity 
around this trend is supposed to be evidence of convergence. (Cushman et al. (2001) apply 
a similar way to analyze price convergence.) However, since this test is not compatible 
with (2), such evidence is rather unreliable: having reached the zero value, the difference 
would be driven further by the linear trend and increase again (in absolute value) with the 
opposite sign. 
Indeed, to analyze convergence in progress, a time series model should include a 
negative trend. However, in order to satisfy (2), this trend has to subside asymptotically, BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/ 2006 
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which results in a nonlinear cointegration relationship. We adopt this approach. Conver-
gence of prices to the equality is modeled as  
prt/pst = 1 + γe
δt, δ<0.                  (3) 
 
To economize notation, the region indices for parameters (and the disturbances dis-
cussed below) are suppressed.  
Parameter δ defines convergence speed. The sign of γ shows the direction of con-
vergence. If γ < 0, the price in r increases faster than in s and catches up with the latter. If γ 
> 0, the price in r rises slower than in s. γ is the initial (at t = 0) deviation of prices from 
parity. If γ = 0, (3) degenerates to (1), whereby convergence of prices is said to be com-
plete by the start of the time period under consideration. Hence, the law of one price holds 
for regions r and s. 
 
 
2.2  Econometrics 
 
To derive a testable version of relationship (3), the logarithmic representation of prices is 
used and stochastic disturbances, νt, are taken into account. They are presumed to be a 
first-order autoregressive process: 
 
Prst = ln(1 + γe
δt) + νt,   νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt,               (4) 
 
where εt is white noise, and γ, δ, and λ are parameters to be estimated. Hereafter, t = 
1,…,T. Substituting the second equation in (4) into the first gives a nonlinear model to be 
estimated and tested: 
 
ΔPrst = λPrs,t–1 + ln(1 + γe
δt) – (λ + 1)ln(1 + γe
δ(t – 1)) + εt.             (5) 
 
I test whether time series {Prst} has no unit root, i.e. that the process is stationary around 
the trend, and if so, whether the time series has a subsiding trend, i.e. γ ≠ 0 and δ < 0. In 
other words, I test the hypotheses H1: λ = 0 (against λ < 0), H2: γ = 0 (against γ ≠ 0), and 
H3: δ ≥ 0 (against δ < 0). Throughout the paper, the 10% significance level is adopted.  Konstantin Gluschenko 
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To test the unit root hypothesis, H1, the t-ratio of λ is used as the test statistic, de-
noted as τNL. The distribution of this statistic differs from the Dickey-Fuller distributions 
and has not been documented in the literature. Therefore, to derive p-values, the empirical 
distribution of τNL under the null hypothesis has been estimated implementing a large set of 
simulations (see Appendix for details and simulation results). To eliminate serial correla-
tion from residuals, the Phillips (1987) transformation is applied to NL ˆ τ  using the Newey-
West (1994) automatic bandwidth selection method with a Bartlett spectral kernel.
3  
If the unit root in (5) is rejected, hypotheses H2 and H3 are tested. Since the time se-
ries is stationary, the ordinary t-test is valid for this. If either of H2 and H3 is not rejected, 
there is no deterministic trend of the given form in the time series (or, when δ > 0, the 
trend is not subsiding). In such an event, as well as in the case of non-rejection of unit root, 
I test whether the process is governed by law (1), as described below. 
The joint rejection of H1, H2, and H3 is interpreted as evidence that the time series 
tested fluctuates around an asymptotically subsiding trend. Hence, prices in r and s are 
converging to equality, so these regions are classed with those trending towards integra-
tion. Parameter λ is interpreted as the rate deviations from trajectory (3) caused by random 
shocks die out. (Alternatively, tHL = ln(0.5)/ln(1 + λ) defines the half-life of deviations. 
With a unit root, i.e. λ = 0, tHL = ∞. Thus, the effect of random shocks is permanent; there 
is no return to trajectory (3). With no autocorrelation, i.e. λ = –1, tHL = 0, the return to tra-
jectory (3) is instantaneous.) 
 
As above, we obtain a testable version of (1): 
 
Prst = νt,   νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt,                 (6) 
or 
 
ΔPrst = λPrs,t–1 + εt,                   (7) 
which is the conventional AR(1) model. 
                                                 
3  This procedure makes it possible to avoid loss of degrees of freedom caused by adding additional lags to 
the regression itself. 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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The hypothesis tested here is whether the time series has a unit root, H′1: λ = 0 (against λ < 
0); the Phillips-Perron test is used for this. The rejection of the unit root is interpreted as 
evidence that the time series fluctuates around zero, i.e. around the equality of prices in r 
and s. Therefore, such regions are classed as integrated. If H′1 is not rejected, the regions 
are deemed non-integrated. 
Note again the different roles of parameters γ and δ vs. parameter λ. The first two 
characterize the long-run behavior of the price differential trajectory, while λ characterizes 
the short-run properties of adjustment toward this trajectory.
4  
A peculiarity of price dynamics in Russia is that a number of regional price time se-
ries contain a structural break caused by the August 1998 financial crisis. The break point 
is not uniform across regions, varying from 1998:08 through 1999:02. With such a break, a 
time series might appear to have a spurious deterministic trend that biases inference toward 
non-rejection of a trend in (5) and toward non-rejection of a unit root in (7). To avoid this, 
(5) and (7) are augmented for breaks, taking the forms 
 
ΔPrst = λPrs,t–1 + ln(1 + (γ + γBBθt)e
δt) – (λ + 1)ln(1 + (γ + γBBθ,t–1)e





ΔPrst = λPrs,t–1 + γB(Bθt – (λ + 1) Bθ,t–1) + εt,              (7
*) 
where Bθt is the structural change dummy such that Bθt = 1 if t < θ, and zero otherwise.
5 
The break point is found by estimating (5
*) and (7
*) for θ = 1998:08,…,1999:02, and then 
choosing θ that yields the least sum of squared residuals. 
In (5
*), the sign of γ + γB shows the direction of convergence before the break point. 
The sign of γ shows the convergence direction from the break point. When γ equals zero, it 
implies that prices in r and s have become close to the equality from the date of the break 
                                                 
4 In the degenerate case of AR(1), the trajectory is a straight line along the time axis that represents price par-
ity. 
5 Specification (7
*) is derived from (6), in which the first equation is augmented with the break dummy. This 
differs from the classical Perron (1990) specification. The common use of two dummies to characterize the 
break – level dummy and pulse – is superfluous. The latter, equaling 1 if t = θ, and 0 otherwise, can be repre-
sented as Bθt – Bθ,t-1. The Perron-type equation is a linear approximation of (7
*), allowing the coefficients on 
Bθt and Bθ,t-1 to be independent. This leads to parameter estimates that, while consistent, are not asymptoti-
cally efficient. For this reason the use of more adequate nonlinear equation (7
*) provides a more powerful 
test. See Gluschenko (2005) for details. Konstantin Gluschenko 
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point onward. If the signs of γ and γB are the same, the break causes a price jump toward 
parity; and opposite signs imply the jump away from parity, provided that |γ| > |γB|.
6  The 
break dummy Bθt is constructed so that the break is always directed toward parity to test 
whether r and s became integrated after the date of structural change. Given γB > 0, the cri-
sis caused price-cutting in r. It otherwise increased the relative price in the region. The hy-
potheses tested for (5
*) are the same as for (5), but H2 which is substituted for H
*
2: γB = 0 
(against γB ≠ 0). For (7
*), a similar hypothesis denoted H
*′2 is tested in addition to H′1. Hy-
potheses H1 and H′1 are tested through the same procedure as described for H1 in (5); how-
ever, estimated empirical distributions of the unit root test statistic are used for time series 
with break, τNL(θ) and τ0(θ), respectively (see Appendix). 
Each time series {Prt} is analyzed as follows: 
Step 1. Model (5
*) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H1, H
*
2, H3 and are jointly 
rejected, regions r and s are deemed to be trending toward integration, {Prst} containing a 
structural break. Otherwise, if the structural break is rejected, the analysis comes to Step 2. 
If it is not (and H1 and/or H3 is not rejected), the analysis continues at Step 3. 
Step 2. Model (5) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 are jointly 
rejected, r and s are deemed as trending toward integration. Otherwise, the analysis moves 
on to Step 3. 
Step 3. Model (7
*) is estimated and tested. If there is no structural break (hypothesis 
H
*′2 is not rejected), the analysis moves to Step 4. If the unit root is rejected, r and s are 
deemed to be integrated (from the period of the break). If not, they are deemed as non-
integrated, {Prst} containing a structural break. 
Step 4. Model (7) is estimated and tested. If the unit root is rejected, r and s are 
deemed to be integrated and non-integrated otherwise. 
There are 75 series of regional prices for Russia, yielding 2,775 region pairs. A stan-
dard way of reducing such a mass of pairwise comparisons in the literature on the law of one 
price and PPP is to take some location as a benchmark as in Parsley and Wei (1996) or Gardner 
and Brooks (1994), to name a few. Here, I choose the national market as a whole as the 
benchmark, because, in the intra-national context, such a benchmark is believed to be natural 
and far more reasonable than an arbitrary region. Thus, integration of each region with the 
                                                 
6 The opposite inequality produces an exotic case of “overshooting.” The jump crosses the price parity line, 
reversing the direction of convergence after the break point. Aside from insignificant γs, there are no such 
cases among the estimates obtained. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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entire national market is analyzed, using only region-Russia pairs. That is, index s in the above 
relationships is fixed, and is set to s = 0, p0t denoting the price in Russia as a whole. Thus, s is 
omitted hereafter; Prt denotes percentage difference in prices between region r and Russia 
as a whole: Prt ≡ ln(prt/p0t). 
Finally, I make a caveat. There may be integration or long-run price convergence 
between two or more regions without integration with, or convergence to, the national 
market. This situation would imply “price convergence clubs” among regional markets, an 
analog of convergence clubs in economic growth (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). 
This issue remains open when comparisons are made with a benchmark rather than within 
each region pair. Gluschenko (2004b, 2004c) provides additional analyses to clarify this 
matter. 
When there are regions trending toward integration and non-integrated regions, the 
trend of the entire market is a priori unclear. In this case, the behavior of the entire cross-
section over time can shed light on the issue. It is reasonable to believe that where σ-
convergence is exhibited, the market as a whole is moving towards integration. The occur-
rence of σ-convergence where non-integrated regions have been detected is evidence that 
long-run convergence of prices prevails over divergence induced by those regions. To ver-
ify the separation of regions into three groups obtained through the time series analysis, σ-
convergence is also analyzed for each group. The group of regions trending toward integra-
tion is expected to display σ-convergence. The group of integrated regions is expected to 
have a near-constant σ. The group of non-integrated regions should show σ-divergence if 
non-integration is due to random walking or deterministic price divergence. However, if 




2.3  Data 
 
The price representative for the analysis is the cost of the basket of 25 food goods defined 
as the standard by the Russian statistical agency, Goskomstat, between January 1997 and 
June 2000. This basket covers about a third of foodstuffs included in the Russian CPI, but 
unlike the CPI, it has constant weights across regions and time.
7 The costs of the basket 
                                                 
7  See Goskomstat (1996) for a description of basket composition. Konstantin Gluschenko 
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(including those for the second half of 2000 and retrospectively calculated for 1994-1996) 
were obtained directly from Goskomstat. 
The price data were collected in capital cities of the Russian regions. The sample 
covers 75 of Russia’s 89 regions. Data are lacking for ten autonomous okrugs, the Chechen 
Republic, and the Republic of Ingushetia. Two other regions are omitted. The City of Mos-
cow is simultaneously an administratively distinct “city-region” of the Russian Federation 
and the capital city of the surrounding Moscow Oblast. The same holds for St. Petersburg 
and the Leningrad Oblast. That is why these cities-regions are present in the sample, while 
their surrounding oblasts are not. The data are monthly, spanning 84 months, from January 
1994 to December 2000. 
There are missing observations in the time series used. Most occur in 1994, which 
has 42 missing observations (4.7% of the yearly total) in 17 regional time series. The re-
mainder of the data set lacks only 9 observations. To fill the gaps, missing prices are ap-
proximated by the food component of the regional monthly CPIs. The interpolated value of 
prt is the arithmetic mean of the nearest known preceding price inflated to the required time 
point, t, and the nearest known succeeding price deflated to t. 
One final aspect of the data used should be mentioned. Retail prices embody re-
gion-specific distribution costs that may violate the law of one price even if wholesale 
prices obey it. Gluschenko (2003) suggests two ways of dealing with the problem. The first 
is to produce proxies of wholesale prices from retail prices. Since prices are monthly, how-
ever, this is inappropriate as data on distribution costs and retail-wholesale margins are 
available only on a yearly basis. Thus, I interpret the spatial variation of distribution costs 
as an additional indication of poor integration. This means extending the notion of market 
integration and considering integration of the goods market as such in conjunction with 
integration of the related markets for distribution services and labor in retail trade.
8 In any 
case, results reported by Gluschenko (2003) suggest that patterns for retail and proxied 




                                                 
8 Such a component of distribution costs like rent does not fit in with this. However, rent does not play a sub-
stantial role in costs of the Russian trade, account for only about 1% of retail prices of goods. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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3  Empirical results  
 
Table 1 summarizes results on integration of each individual region with the entire national 
market. For a given region, the table reports results for one of models (5
*), (5), (7
*), and 
(7), depending on which is accepted as describing price behavior in the region.
9 Reporting 
all parameters – λ, γ, γB, and δ – means the acceptance of model (5
*); reporting λ, γ, and δ 
implies that (5) is accepted. In either case, the region is deemed as trending toward integra-
tion. If there are only λ and γB in the table, then model (7
*) is accepted; and the only pa-
rameter λ is reported when (7) is accepted. In the last two cases, the region is deemed as in-
tegrated if the unit root is rejected (the p-value of the unit root test is less than, or equal to, 
0.1); otherwise the region is deemed as non-integrated. 
Standard deviations are presented in Table 1 in parentheses. Asterisks, ***, **, and 
*, denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Bold italics indicate p-
values of the unit root test over 10%. Horizontal borders separate economic areas (eko-
nomicheskiy rayon). The composition of these areas and their names appear on the map in 
Figure 2. Regions are arranged geographically in the table according to their traditional 
ordering in Goskomstat’s publications up to June 2000 (except the Kaliningrad Oblast, 
which is added to the Northwestern Area). 
 
Table 1. Summary of estimations and unit root tests 
Region 
Unit root 
test         
p-value 
λ  γ  Structural break (γB)  δ 
  1. Rep. of Karelia  0.003  -0.423  (0.091) 0.186  (0.030)
***      -0.011  (0.004)
*** 
  2. Rep. of Komi
d   0.002  -0.439  (0.092) 0.005  (0.058) 0.227  (0.072)
*** -0.017  (0.006)
*** 
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl.
d 0.006  -0.428  (0.093) 0.195  (0.049)
*** 0.119  (0.039)
*** -0.014  (0.003)
*** 
  4. Vologda Obl.  0.001  -0.347  (0.089)     -0.043  (0.010)
***     
  5. Murmansk Obl.  0.160  -0.013  (0.009)     -0.207  (0.036)
***     
  6. St. Petersburg  0.306  -0.028  (0.024)     -0.183  (0.036)
***     
  7. Novgorod Obl.  0.000  -0.677  (0.106)     -0.034  (0.007)
***     
  8. Pskov Obl.  0.023  -0.181  (0.069)     -0.088  (0.021)
***     
  9. Kaliningrad Obl.  0.015  -0.173  (0.063)     -0.125  (0.030)
***     
10. Bryansk Obl.
a 0.066  -0.274  (0.083) -0.385  (0.108)
*** 0.147  (0.088)
* -0.018  (0.004)
*** 
11. Vladimir Obl.  0.025  -0.175  (0.067)     -0.122  (0.018)
***     
12. Ivanovo Obl.  0.002  -0.301  (0.084)     -0.090  (0.012)
***     
13. Kaluga Obl.  0.035  -0.239  (0.073) -0.236  (0.075)
***      -0.042  (0.017)
** 
14. Kostroma Obl.  0.308  -0.078  (0.053)     -0.090  (0.028)
***     
15. Moscow
a  0.691  -0.003  (0.013)     -0.070  (0.028)
**     
16. Oryol Obl.  0.015  -0.328  (0.085) -0.313  (0.029)
***      -0.017  (0.003)
*** 
17. Ryazan Obl.  0.017  -0.153  (0.060)     -0.083  (0.019)
***     
18. Smolensk Obl.  0.000  -0.534  (0.101) -0.090  (0.036)
** -0.133  (0.032)
*** -0.009  (0.004)
** 
19. Tver Obl.  0.000  -0.344  (0.082)     -0.118  (0.013)
***     
20. Tula Obl.  0.009  -0.299  (0.072) -0.145  (0.053)
*** -0.082  (0.044)
* -0.016  (0.005)
*** 
21. Yaroslavl Obl.  0.000  -0.388  (0.088)     -0.077  (0.009)
***     
22. Rep. of Mariy El   0.330  -0.014  (0.015)             
                                                 
9 The working paper version, Gluschenko (2004b), Appendix B, provides the full set of estimates. Konstantin Gluschenko 
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Region 
Unit root 
test         
p-value 
λ  γ  Structural break (γB)  δ 
23. Rep. of Mordovia  0.196  -0.015  (0.014)     0.125  (0.039)
***     
24. Chuvash Rep.
b   0.544  -0.012  (0.018)     -0.070  (0.027)
**     
25. Kirov Obl.  0.277  -0.050  (0.040)     -0.125  (0.030)
***     
26. Nizhni Novgorod Obl.
c 0.063  -0.129  (0.057)     -0.099  (0.024)
***     
27. Belgorod Obl.  0.000  -0.470  (0.095) -0.261  (0.027)
***      -0.012  (0.003)
*** 
28. Voronezh Obl.
a 0.000  -0.524  (0.098) -0.646  (0.142)
*** 0.249  (0.129)
* -0.029  (0.003)
*** 
29. Kursk Obl.  0.000  -0.471  (0.097) -0.245  (0.025)
***      -0.015  (0.003)
*** 
30. Lipetsk Obl.  0.002  -0.468  (0.095) -0.391  (0.071)
*** 0.134  (0.059)
** -0.015  (0.003)
*** 
31. Tambov Obl.
b 0.004  -0.362  (0.082) -0.176  (0.046)
*** -0.068  (0.033)
** -0.007  (0.003)
** 
32. Rep. of Kalmykia
 b   0.000  -0.548  (0.103) -0.045  (0.038) -0.117  (0.037)
*** -0.012  (0.005)
** 
33. Rep. of Tatarstan  0.000  -0.614  (0.101) -0.363  (0.058)
*** 0.077  (0.045)
* -0.008  (0.002)
*** 
34. Astrakhan Obl.  0.000  -0.701  (0.106) -0.181  (0.020)
***      -0.025  (0.005)
*** 
35. Volgograd Obl.
d 0.000  -0.354  (0.084)     -0.099  (0.015)
***     
36. Penza Obl.  0.026  -0.279  (0.078) -0.227  (0.027)
***      -0.010  (0.003)
** 
37. Samara Obl.  0.000  -0.376  (0.087)             
38. Saratov Obl.  0.014  -0.316  (0.082) -0.178  (0.035)
***      -0.010  (0.005)
** 
39. Ulyanovsk Obl.  0.000  -0.577  (0.098) -0.600  (0.068)
*** 0.152  (0.057)
*** -0.013  (0.002)
*** 
40. Rep. of Adygeya   0.000  -0.772  (0.108) -0.366  (0.068)
*** 0.118  (0.059)
** -0.018  (0.003)
*** 
41. Rep. of Dagestan  0.000  -0.574  (0.101) -0.122  (0.023)
***      -0.012  (0.005)
** 
42. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.   0.000  -0.231  (0.040) -0.828  (0.079)
***      -0.093  (0.017)
*** 
43. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep.  0.158  -0.080  (0.044)             
44. Rep. of Northern Ossetia   0.002  -0.445  (0.093) -0.243  (0.032)
***      -0.025  (0.005)
*** 
45. Krasnodar Krai  0.000  -0.619  (0.105) -0.430  (0.157)
*** 0.234  (0.140)
* -0.020  (0.005)
*** 
46. Stavropol Krai  0.000  -0.554  (0.100) -0.165  (0.016)
***      -0.009  (0.003)
*** 
47. Rostov Obl.  0.000  -0.679  (0.106) -0.185  (0.012)
***      -0.007  (0.002)
*** 
48. Rep. of Bashkortostan
 d   0.005  -0.240  (0.073)     -0.126  (0.024)
***     
49. Udmurt Rep.
c   0.015  -0.185  (0.064)     -0.129  (0.022)
***     
50. Kurgan Obl.
c 0.007  -0.131  (0.042)     -0.099  (0.031)
***     
51. Orenburg Obl.
b 0.017  -0.167  (0.060)     -0.110  (0.040)
***     
52. Perm Obl.  0.003  -0.372  (0.082) 0.160  (0.074)
**      -0.084  (0.039)
** 
53. Sverdlovsk Obl.  0.020  -0.292  (0.081) 0.119  (0.044)
***      -0.021  (0.012)
* 
54. Chelyabinsk Obl.  0.000  -0.698  (0.105)             
55. Rep. of Altai  0.000  -0.401  (0.088)             
56. Altai Krai  0.385  -0.023  (0.024)     0.077  (0.039)
*     
57. Kemerovo Obl.
e 0.000  -0.310  (0.069)     0.038  (0.015)
**     
58. Novosibirsk Obl.
e 0.000  -0.306  (0.070)     0.033  (0.013)
**     
59. Omsk Obl.
e 0.000  -0.578  (0.101) -0.910  (0.296)
*** 0.667  (0.282)
** -0.034  (0.005)
*** 
60. Tomsk Obl.  0.000  -0.252  (0.071)             
61. Tyumen Obl.  0.027  -0.138  (0.056)     0.068  (0.024)
***     
62. Rep. of Buryatia  0.004  -0.232  (0.073)     0.118  (0.022)
***     
63. Rep. of Tuva   0.233  -0.073  (0.046)     0.118  (0.044)
***     
64. Rep. of Khakasia
e   0.015  -0.200  (0.068)     0.038  (0.018)
**     
65. Krasnoyarsk Krai  0.012  -0.196  (0.066)     0.070  (0.026)
***     
66. Irkutsk Obl.
f 0.001  -0.342  (0.085)     0.147  (0.026)
***     
67. Chita Obl.  0.001  -0.450  (0.091) 0.298  (0.076)
*** 0.106  (0.054)
* -0.012  (0.003)
*** 
68. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)   0.513  -0.007  (0.013)             
69. Jewish Autonomous Obl.
f 0.003 -0.422  (0.091) 0.183  (0.045)
*** 0.148  (0.035)
*** -0.010  (0.003)
*** 
70. Primorsky Krai  0.040  -0.282  (0.081) 0.545  (0.060)
***      -0.008  (0.002)
*** 
71. Khabarovsk Krai
d 0.000  -0.571  (0.104) 0.298  (0.048)
*** 0.143  (0.034)
*** -0.007  (0.002)
*** 
72. Amur Obl.
c 0.005  -0.216  (0.063)     0.170  (0.028)
***     
73. Kamchatka Obl.
d  0.694  -0.005  (0.014)     0.179  (0.063)
***     
74. Magadan Obl.
d  0.359  -0.008  (0.010)     0.155  (0.051)
***     
75. Sakhalin Obl.
d  0.414  -0.010  (0.014)     0.137  (0.055)
**     
a Break in 1998:08; b Break in 1998:10; c Break in 1998:11; d Break in 1998:12; e Break in 1999:01; f Break in 1999:02. Breaks not 
marked take place in 1998:09. 
 
 
Out of all 75 regions, 27, or 36%, are deemed as integrated with the national market. An-
other 15 (20%) are non-integrated regions that show no trend toward integration. The 
minimal p-value of the unit root test equals 0.158 among regions for which the unit root is 
not rejected in model (7) or (7
*). Thus, the test results can be taken as fairly reliable despite 
the low power of the unit root tests. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Taking the structural break into account significantly increases the number of inte-
grated regions. The unit root for eight regions, rejected in (7
*), is not rejected in (7). As the 
break dummy equals 1 before the break point, and 0 thereafter, these regions became inte-
grated in the “after-break” period. Hence, the 1998 financial crisis facilitated price equaliz-
ing among Russian regions, improving the pattern of regional integration. St. Petersburg 
provides the only opposite case, where the unit root is rejected in (7), but not in (7
*). The 
1998 crisis caused a persistent rise in prices in that city compared to the average Russian 
price that prevented integration with the national market. 
The structural break is not rejected for 23 of 27 integrated regions. Of these, 15 re-
gions have an upward break, i.e. the crisis forced a rise in relative prices in these regions. 
All regions lie in the European part of Russia. For eight regions in the Asian part of Russia 
(Siberia and the Far East), the break is downward, implying a decline in relative prices. 
The same pattern is valid for non-integrated regions (the structural break is rejected for 
only three of them) with the sole exception of the Republic of Mordovia. Thus, the 1998 
crises drew prices in the Asian and European parts of Russia together, since prices had, as 
a rule, been higher in the east than in the west prior to the crisis. 
The number of regions tending to integration with the national market is 33, or 44% 
of the total. For most of them (24 of 33, or 73%), convergence is “upward”, i.e. from lower 
prices towards the national average. Of these regions, the lowest starting price level, 0.17 
(=1 + γ + γB), was found in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic; the highest one, 0.88, was in 
the Republic of Dagestan. There are nine regions (27% of 33 regions) with “downward” 
convergence. They have the starting price levels from 1.12 in the Sverdlovsk Oblast to 
1.54 in the Primorsky Krai. All these are regions in the Northern area, Urals, Siberia, or the 
Far East. There is the only region with “upward” convergence, the Omsk Oblast in West-
ern Siberia. Expressed as a percentage, |e
δ – 1|⋅100, the convergence speed varies from 
0.7% to 8.9% per month in the case of “upward” convergence, and from 0.7% to 8.1% in 
the case of “downward” convergence. The starting price gap, |γ + γB|, and the rate of “up-
ward” convergence are strongly positively correlated: the correlation coefficient equals 
0.79. However, the pattern is reverse for “downward” convergence: the greater the gap, the 
slower convergence. Here, the correlation coefficient equals –0.52. 
The structural break is not rejected for about a half of regions (namely, 16) trending 
toward integration. In turn, these are divide almost in half between the nine in which the 
break has facilitated convergence (γ and γB have the same signs) and pushed prices toward Konstantin Gluschenko 
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the Russian average, and the eight regions where the break has pushed prices away from 
the average (γ and γB have opposite signs) and thus slowed convergence. There are two re-
gions, the republics of Komi and Kalmykia, with statistically insignificant γ. The implica-
tion is that prices have come close to the national average after the break point. Thus, these 
regions might just as well be deemed integrated. 
Neglecting the structural break would markedly distort the pattern. There are 12 
cases, where the break is spuriously treated as a trend in (5). These regions would be 
deemed as trending toward integration, when they are, in fact, either already integrated or 
non-integrated without any trend toward integration. 
There are 15 non-integrated regions (20% of 75 regions) that show no trend toward 
integration with the national market. If models (7) and (7
*) are augmented for the constant 
term, the unit root is not rejected only for two of these regions, the Magadan and Sakhalin 
oblasts. This suggests that non-integration is almost entirely caused by a constant non-zero 
disparity between prices in a given region and the national price, and not by deterministic 
or stochastic price divergence. 
Overall, the 1998 crisis strongly affected regional price dynamics. Nevertheless, the 
behavior of prices remained intact in a number of regions. The break is rejected for 23 re-
gions (31% of 75 regions). In these regions, the crisis caused a spike, after which relative 
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The spatial structure of market integration is presented in Figure 2. About a half of 
the non-integrated regions are concentrated in Central Russia. In particular, all but one of 
the regions in the Volga-Vyatka area are non-integrated. The pattern is rather surprising, 
because these are small regions with relatively short distances between them. Moreover, 
this part of the country has highly developed transport infrastructure. It can be surmised 
that it is the atomistic administrative-territorial division of Central Russia that causes mar-
ket segmentation: the more regional borders and governors, the more possibilities to im-
pede inter-regional trade and diversify price policies across space. Curiously, the Uly-
anovsk Oblast, which maintained price regulation and subsidies until the beginning of 
2001, is trending toward integration with the national market. The Moscow time series has 
an “almost confident” unit root, λ = –0.003. No correlation, however, is found between 
non-integration and the “Red Belt” regions reported by Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) – 
even in the European part of Russia. 
On the other hand, non-integrated regions are rare in Siberia and the Far East. This 
corroborates Gluschenko’s (2003) finding that the Asian part of Russia, excluding diffi-
cult-to-access regions, is more integrated than European Russia. Figure 2 provides addi-
tional evidence that all difficult-to-access regions (the Murmansk, Magadan, Sakhalin, and 
Kamchatka oblasts, and the Republic of Yakutia) are, as might be expected, not integrated 
with the national market. It also supports Gluschenko’s (2003, 2004a) insight that these 
regions markedly contribute to the overall disconnectedness of regional markets. 
In the full set of estimates (Gluschenko, 2004b), the unit root in (7) or/and (7
*) is 
rejected for 20 regions recognized as trending toward integration. Thus, if the traditional 
approach to the time series analysis of integration is used, 47 regions (or 63% of the total) 
would be deemed as integrated with the national market, and 28 regions (37%) would be 
non-integrated. 
Among all the 75 estimates of model (5), 13 non-subsiding trends (δ > 0) occur, 
implying divergence of prices. However, ten of these trends have a statistically insignifi-
cant  δ, and two have an insignificant factor γ. Moscow has the only significant non-
subsiding trend. When the structural break is considered, the number of positive estimates 
of δ increases to 20 in model (5
*), seven of them for the same regions as in (5). Of these 
20, 13 are insignificant, two are accompanied with non-rejection of the unit root in the 
model, and one is accompanied with insignificant γ + γB. In this case, the δ for Moscow is 
insignificant. Instead, there are four significant non-subsiding trends for other regions. For 
two of these, the unit root is rejected in (7
*), so only two cases of price divergence remain. Konstantin Gluschenko 
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This pattern gives grounds to believe that the trend towards convergence of prices is pre-
dominant in the Russian market. 
This view is supported by the dynamics of price dispersion plotted in Figure 3. The 
price dispersion is measured by σt, the standard deviation of prices normalized to the Rus-
sian average. The trajectory of σt suggests price dispersion over all regions was decreasing 
until mid-1999. This is clear evidence of σ-convergence in 1994-2000, suggesting that the 
Russian market is moving toward integration. 
Additional trajectories for the region groups provide insight into the pattern of changes in 
price dispersion. For comparability, standard deviations for region groups are computed 
with the use of the mean over all regions rather than that over a given group. This implies 
that price dispersion is measured relative to the whole of the country, i.e. it is not within-
group dispersion. Thus, price dispersion over all Russian regions is a weighted average of 
group dispersions, σt = (R1/R)σt1 + (R2/R)σt2 + (R3/R)σt3, the weight being the proportion of 
the group in the total number of regions (σti denotes the standard deviation of prices in re-
gion group i). The proportion of the integrated regions is 0.36, that of the non-integrated 
regions is 0.20, and that of the regions trending toward integration is 0.44. 
The structural break caused by the August 1998 financial crisis is pronounced on 
the trajectories of σ and seems to reduce price dispersion. As expected, the main contribu-
tion to the decrease of price dispersion is from regions trending toward integration. While 
Figure 3. Standard deviations of log relative cost of the 25-item food basket BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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price dispersion in such regions and that in the whole of the country are roughly equal at 
the beginning of the time span under consideration, the gap between them widens quickly 
over time. For integrated regions, price dispersion is the lowest and near constant, fluctuat-
ing around a level of 0.11 before the 1998 crisis and 0.07 after January 1999. 
The most price dispersion is inherent in the non-integrated regions. The trajectory 
for this group has the most pronounced structural break, reducing the group price disper-
sion by about a quarter. However, the main contribution comes from the difficult-to-access 
regions. Computing for non-integrated regions excluding those difficult to access, the tra-
jectory of σ appears to have no break. Contrary to theoretical expectations, this subgroup 
does not exhibit increasing price dispersion. The reason is that there is almost no price di-
vergence in the Russian market. Indeed, as mentioned above, the full set of estimates pro-
vides only two clear cases of price divergence; regions deemed as non-integrated are for 
the most part those having a persistent difference from the average Russian price. 
 
 
4  Conclusions 
 
Using the cost of the basket of 25 basic food goods as the price representative, the spatial 
structure of market integration in Russia in 1994-2000 was analyzed. It was found that 
over a third of Russian regions (36%) could be deemed as integrated with the national 
market over 1994-2000, while slightly less than half of regions (44%) could be classed as 
trending toward integration. One fifth of the regions (20%) were found non-integrated. 
However, final assessment may be overstated, since the strict version of the law of one 
price was used as an indication of integration. It does not allow for such an irremovable 
market friction as spatial separation of regions. 
Overall, the results unambiguously suggest that the Russian market has been mov-
ing toward integration. The largest exception is the group of difficult-to-access regions. 
Logically, difficult access presents an insurmountable market friction, so the lack of inte-
gration of these regions is more likely due to geographical realities than a particular eco-
nomic policy, national or regional.  
The evolution of price dispersion plotted in Figure 3 suggests that this movement 
nearly ceased around the beginning of 2000. Extending the price dispersion trajectory to 
the end of 2004 in Gluschenko and Kulighina (2006) corroborates this. A reasonable ex-
planation seems to be that price convergence in Russia was for the most part completed by Konstantin Gluschenko 
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that time, having reached a “feasible” bound of goods market integration. This raises the 
question of whether a Russian common market has emerged. 
     Reasoning from the theoretical benchmark of complete integration, the situation is 
fairly muddied, as much as a fifth of all regions are not integrated and not trending toward 
integration. However, when compared with an actual benchmark (say, the United States, 
which is widely held to have the most integrated goods market in the world), we arrive at a 
different conclusion. 
Gluschenko and Kulighina (2006) perform such a comparison with the use of the 
costs of a 27-item grocery basket across US cities. Regarding Russia excluding difficult-to-
access regions, they find price dispersion in the Russian market (represented by the staples 
baskets) comparable with that of the US market (represented by the grocery basket) by the 
early 2000s. Moreover, the estimated degrees of market integration in Russia and the 
United States in 2000 prove to be very close to each other. Thus, it can be concluded that 
Russia has a common market. 
The issue of whether Russia has become a normal middle-income capitalist country 
as a result of the transition remains debatable, considering its economic and political sys-
tem as a whole (see Shleifer and Treisman, 2005, vs. Rosefielde, 2005). But regarding 
goods market integration, we would agree with Shleifer and Treisman (2005) that Russia 
has become a fairly normal country. 
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Appendix 
Unit root test statistics for models with nonlinear trend, with nonlinear trend and break, 
and with break only 
To derive p-values of the t-ratio of λ that is used in the unit root test for model (5), the 
model was estimated over each of 500,000 simulated random walks to obtain an empirical 
distribution of this statistic under the null hypothesis. The statistic is referred to as τNL. De-
noting the number of simulation i, the random walk series were generated as 







t P P ε + = − , where 
) (i
t ε ∼ N(0,1); t = 1,…,83; 
) (
0
i P = 0. 
Table A1 reports some critical values of τNL. For comparison, MacKinnon’s (1996) critical 
values for the Dickey-Fuller test with no constant, with constant, with constant and trend, 
and with constant, trend and trend squared (τ0, τc, τct, and τctt statistic, respectively) for the 
sample size of 83 are reported as well. Figure A1 demonstrates the probability density of 
τNL and its cumulative distribution in comparison with those of conventional τ-statistics. 
Figure A2 plots the 10-percent tails of the cumulative distributions. 
 
 
  Table A1. Critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics 
Significance level  τNL  τ0  τc  τct  τctt 
0.1%  -4.820 -3.363 -4.251 -4.808 -5.258 
1%  -3.963 -2.593 -3.511 -4.072 -4.516 
5%  -3.310 -1.945 -2.897 -3.465 -3.906 
10% -2.978  -1.614 -2.586 -3.159 -3.598 
20%  -2.585 -1.228 -2.223 -2.804 -3.242 
 
 
     Fig. A1. Distributions of τ-statistics: (a) probability densities; (b) cumulative distributions 
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Fig. A2. Left-hand tails of cumulative distributions of τ-statistics 
 
As seen from the table and figures, at any given test size (except those lower than 0.002), 
rejecting the unit root in the case of nonlinear trend of form (3) needs smaller (absolute) 
values for the statistic than in the case of linear trend (or quadratic trend, for that matter). 
Along most of its length, the cumulative distribution of τNL lies between τc and τct. 
Empirical distributions for the case of structural break in time series were computed 
in a similar way. The unit root test statistic for the model with a nonlinear trend and a 
structural break, i.e. model (5
*), is denoted by τNL(θ), where θ is a break point. τ0(θ) labels 
the statistic for model (7
*), which includes a structural break only. Table A2 reports some 
critical values of these estimated statistics. Figure A3 demonstrates the 10-percent tails of 
their cumulative distributions. For comparison, selected Dickey-Fuller τ-statistics are in-
cluded in Table A2 and plotted in Figure A3. 
 
 
     Table A2. Critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics for models with structural break 
Model with nonlinear trend and break (5
*) 
τNL(θ) with θ =  Significance  
level  τNL 
1998:08 1998:09 1998:10 1998:11 1998:12 1999:01 1999:02 
τct  
0.1%  -4.820 -4.853 -4.861 -4.875 -4.889 -4.882 -4.872 -4.872 -4.808 
1%  -3.963 -4.034 -4.045 -4.052 -4.055 -4.064 -4.058 -4.065 -4.072 
5%  -3.310 -3.357 -3.369 -3.372 -3.376 -3.379 -3.378 -3.381 -3.465 
10%  -2.978 -3.017 -3.027 -3.030 -3.035 -3.036 -3.038 -3.039 -3.159 
20%  -2.585 -2.622 -2.630 -2.633 -2.635 -2.638 -2.640 -2.641 -2.804 
Model without trend and with break (7
*) 
τ0(θ) with θ =  Significance  
level  τ0 
1998:08 1998:09 1998:10 1998:11 1998:12 1999:01 1999:02 
τc 
0.1%  -3.363 -3.835 -3.836 -3.834 -3.842 -3.848 -3.858 -3.852 -4.251 
1%  -2.593 -2.918 -2.923 -2.929 -2.936 -2.942 -2.948 -2.950 -3.511 
5%  -1.945 -2.092 -2.091 -2.099 -2.105 -2.111 -2.116 -2.117 -2.897 
10%  -1.614 -1.675 -1.676 -1.681 -1.683 -1.686 -1.688 -1.691 -2.586 
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As might be expected, the cumulative distributions of τ0(θ) lie between the Dickey-Fuller 
distribution for models with and without the constant term. The distributions of τ0(θ) are 
also closer to that of τ0 than τc. The distributions for the model with nonlinear trend and 
break, τNL(θ), lie to the left of the relevant model without break. They still lie to the right 
of the distribution for the model with linear trend, however, except for low p-values (0.015 
and smaller). In both cases, distributions for different break dates θ are very close to one 
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